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SUBMARINES IN MODERN WAR
By REAR ADMIRAL LUTZOW
'IAere ilf olle phau in this '~~Ir Q/~ which tlte leader8 oj tlte Allied camp hm'e
not (li<1played optiminn ill recent montM. 011 the cOlltmry. they ha've cO/I«i8tetllly
"tre«aed the /l'itilMto t1'II81INlIOWltlld rfiiJicultie8 fucitl.g them in thill plUMe. 1J'e refer
tQ the 1111"llcces,~""1 baltle oj the Allies (lyaill8/. Ucrman 8l1bmarillu.
11/ tl'e foiloloill(J article, specioll!1 'lIIriltell lor "The X Xlh Cenl"rg." .ddmir(ll
£'Iil::ow. lite 01/181(1/1(1;'11/ German flat.,r/ commentator, prese/II" Iti", idea« Oil the 8l1bjtet.
-K.M.
THE aim of naval waJiare has alwaysbeen to gain supremacy over mari-time connections. To keep these
open for oneself and to close them for
the enemy-that was the objcct of the
st,ruggle. ,In former centmies the deci-
sions in such naval wars were always
brought about in naval battles fought by
fleets of warships. The victor of these
battles could send out his own merchant
ships and drive those of the enemy off
the seas. ConsequentIy, the proportionate
strength of the various navies ai the
beginning of a war had an im~ant
bearing on such decisions. And since,
in contrast to the land, the open scas
know no obstacles of terrll,in, a com-
parison of the numbers of warships ready
for action was a good standard on which
to base an estimate of the ratio of strength.
These well-founded views on naval
warfare were suddenly blown sky-high
by the sinking of the three British armored
cruisers Hogue, Cre8tty, and Aboukit, by a
German submarine, commanded by Otto
Weddigen, on Septe:rp.l~r 12, I~J4. For
this proved with one st.roke t.hat the
submarine was able to pierce the naval
supremacy of even the strongest battle
fleet. Without regard for the enemy's
numerical superiority, the submarine
could injure his maritime communications
and their protection, indeed, even destroy
them, without, on the other hand, being
able to ensure its own side's maritime
connections.
The fact that" as l\ result of these
expel'iences, the German V-boat attacks
were directed from 1915 onwards, not so
much against the warships of the 'enemy,
as against his merchant fleets w~ br<?~ght
about by the hunger blockade impOstm
upon Germany by Great Bri~.·, In
order to carry out this blockade, the
British Admiralty kept back its Navy
and carefully avoided any battle and, as
far as possible, any contact with' V~boats.
We replied to the hunger blockade with
a counterblockade by V-boats.' From
HH4to 1918, Britain employed about ~hroo
thousand vessels against the V-boats and
fought them with depth ~harge~I,,i;nin;e:
nets, captive balloons, airships, hydro-'
planes, and V-boat traps. 'By 'the, m-
trodu<'tion of the convoy systeni'iil' 1917,
she banished the danger to such a degree
that the revolution in Germany prevented
the V-boat war from taking full effect.
In the autumn of 1918 there were 436
Gel'man submarines under construction.
(This figure is the largMt yet revealed
in this co.nnection and, coming as it
does Jmm an eminent'aut!w"tY, seems to
1£8 to be oj st'nsational significance. If, by
th,e end oj the first World War. Germany,
cut oJ! from aU 801lrCe8 of IfUpply and
lacki'W} a clear naval policy, was working
on 436 U -boat8, one can imagine what mmt
be going on on the wlulrves oj ,all Europe
toda,y, when Ote leaders oj Germany are
fully awal..~e to the paramount importance
oj submarine war/a,re.-The Editor.}
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I n tho autumn of 19:~1l, the English
Prime Ministt'r assured his nation that
England possessed a means of defense
again. t the newly arising U-boat menace
t·hat would certainly do 1\way with this
menace. What he meant WL~fiI the system
of convoys. which indeed wa.'! carried out
with deie~mination and skill and with
the experien(',68 of the Great War to go
by. Yet it did not fulfill t.h(~ expectations
placoo on it. In November I\)40, Churchill
had to admit in a radio speech that the
growing U-boat menace was the most
outstanding sign of the cJitical situation
of tile British Empire. And the U-boat
menace was growing in spite of an
oxcellt'ntly flmctioning system of convoy~.
The danger (lid not diminiRh, for tht'
feverish improvement and reinforcement
of dpfen"i \'C mansuros wer(\ balanced by
incrt-'asing V-boat attacks. ]n Novembe'"r
) 940. the (:erman High Command revealed
for the lirst time t.hat V-boats had Rue-
cessfuUy attacked n convoy not only
singly but in pllcks.
Chur('hiU's ('ries for help to Roosevelt
beca.m(' mOI'C urgmlt. 'Vhen the sill.kingtl
figure decreased in the H('cond half of
1941, Lonrlon gave u sigh of relief. Tht'
reasons for this decrease could not be
immediately I\S('l'l·tained. They were to
be found in the restmint plaood lIpon
V-boats towards the l'lhips of the United
Statell, whicll country was officially 8till
neutraJ. This restraint wus imposed by
the Oerml\n f:O\'ernment for reasons of
foreign policy. Another reason for the
decrease in I;inkin~s wa." to be attributed
to the fact that it- was necessary to send
a considerable pnl·t of the U-boats to
the Arctic Ocean in order to impede the
delivery of war materials to the Soviet
UniOD, a8 well l\8 to the Mediwrmncan
in order to interfere with British ship-
pm, between GibraltaI' and Alexandria.
Suooess' was not long in appearing in
the Mediterranean. The large offensi \'e
~ .on November 18, 1941, against
Rommel .in Libya was founded on the
Conviction Churohill had expressed on
Novemh,er 12 that the British were the
1Il88ters of the Mediterranean. However
in November and December 1941, all
British battleships in the Mediterranean
were either sunk (Barham) or Pllt O\lt of
commission for months (Malaya, Volia,,,,',
and Queen. El1'znbeJJ,.). Moreover, our 'air-
planes rendered Malta temporarily as
good as uD.'*lrviooahle as a flying base;
and one aircraft carrier (Ark Royal),
several cruisers and destroYers. as well as
a dozen or so transports. ~'ere Runk. All
this brought the British 8upplil18 to
Egypt and Tobruk to a halt. At the
san10 time. the supplies for our own
troopt4 in Africa could be sent (rom Italy
to Tripolis without hindrance. Rnd in this
way enubled Rommel by the l'nd of the
year to undertake his victorious ('ountt>r-
attack.
]n tho meantime, ROO8f>velt. through
his provocative attitude toward the Em-
peror of Japan, brought down upon
himself the declaration of war on the
part of the Tripartite poWl'rs. the first
anniversary of which historic e\'ent, we
are now celebrating. 111e Anglo-Ameri-
can battle fleet immediately suffered
heavy defeats in Pearl Harbor and off
Malava. defeats which resulted in a
complete reversal of the war 8ituation in
the Pacific. To this WllS 800n added
another equally great disaster when. on
January 24, 1042, German submal'ines
appeared suddenly in North American
coastal waters and, more or less under
the eyes of the Statue of I..iberty, sank
one ship after allothpI', especially oil
tankerg, off New York as well as many
other ports, without an effective protec-
tion against these attacks being devised
during the first few months. OUl' U-boats
had not been con8idered able to carry
the war to America on thpir own. The
Allies wcre surprised and unprepared
whcn th('! U -boatR carried their attacb
into the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean,
the South Atlantic. and eVl'n the Indian
Ooean and al~ in conjunction with air-
planl'8, gained considemble SUC008868 'in
the Mediterrnnean and the Aretic Ocean..
Although the t'xtension of the U-boa.ts'
field of operation places great dem.da
on both ships and Crell"B, it haa inC('eUed
their chances of success. For the' tactics
of the U-boat wnrfllre con~i8ted in keep-
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ing under observation the weak spots in
die enemy's maritime connections, which
change according to the situation, and
in attacking so suddenly that the enemy's
measures of protection can only be taken
after the V-boats have finished their job.
As the battlefield extended, tho distances
between the various V-boat attacks grew
proportionately, the enemy protection
needed all the more time t{) appear at a
new scene of attack, fmd the V-boats
could continue their attacks that much
longer before being driven off. Thus, for
instance, U-boats and airplancs together
succeeded in the period from July 2 to
7, 1942, in destroying every single ship of
a convoy of 3H vcssels headed for t,he
Murma.nsk coast.
The only means of banning tJle danger
seemed to be the rnpid and increased
construction of ships. The United States
took the lead in this, Admiral Land,
who demanded that ships be constructed
solidly, was ovcrshadowcd by Admiral
Vickery, who insisted upon the most
rapid possible construction without regard
to solidity. In spite of this, the lead of
the U-boots has not yet been diminished,
since the increase in the construction of
shipe was balanced by an increase in the
number of our 8ubma,rines ready for
action. Our enemies agree with us that
the V-boats are the most urgent threat
to them. When, at the beginning of
November 1942, they had to tukc upon
themselves the risk of landing in North
Africa, they were fully aware how difficult
it would be to safeguard their supplies
against U-boat attacks.
Meanwhile, on thc annivcrsar~' of
Japan's entry into the war, we proudly
realize the fact of the close reciprocal
effect of our simultaneous victorics in the
Atlantic and the Pacific. The naval
1088e8 in the Mediterranean
towards the end of 1941 pre-
vented the British from send-
ing an adequate number of
shipe to ensure their position
of naval power in the East and
contributed toward their de-
feats off Malaya, in the Java
Sea (February, 1942), and in the Coral :s<'a
(May 19(2). The shortage of Mipping
space caused by our attacks in the At-
lantic )lfCvcnted reinforcements arriving
in time at Singapore. as was confirmed
by Churchill himself in LL spe<'ch before
Parliament.
C'hurchill has also ndluitt<'<1 tc) Par-
liament that our V-boat successes in tho
Atlantic have forced the Vnit<"d States
to increase her protection thcl'£! at t.he
cost of her safety in the Pacitic, And
the repeated victories ngainRt convoys in
the Arctic Ocean have tied lIJI not only
British but also American lwavy forct's
in the North Atlantic. The reperclUI6ions
from tho Pacific were eqmtlly important..
There the Japa,nese victoric.s prevented
the USA from concentrating her forcos
in the Atlantic. Moreo\"cr, the loss of
raw-material SOUl'COS in the PaQific has
forced the USA t{) obtllin substitutes
from cOlmtl'ies whose mal'itinle connec-
tions are directly threattmed by our
V-boats, for example, tin from Bolivia
and rubber from Brazil. The appearance
of Japanese 8ubmal'ines in the Indian
Ocean split up the naval protection of
tho British and the Amcrican~ even
further and benl'fitt'd thc hattl(· ()f tons
in the Atlantic. The fighting around the
Solomon Islands, whidl broke out in
August Bl4t, hilS cost the US Navy
mllny unit:-; of the indispensable classes
of cruisers, airl'rllft cllrrier!'!, and destroyers
and hUiI wenkencd its offensive and de-
fensivc power Oil aU other tlu"ilters of
war, on the .-\fl·ican COlIst as much as
anywhere else.
Thus the events on tbe ,-anous theaters
are closely related to each other, And
just as the war aims of Germany. Italy,
Md Japan rWl parallel in that, they are
all centered on freeing their "living
space" from Anglo-America.
despotism, their naval warfare
on the vast oceans is also one
great joint undertaking. Just
as the Japanese Fleet haa lived
up to its task in the Pacific,
the German U-boats have ful-
filled their task in the Atlantic.
